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                 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
2
                      ALEXANDRIA DIVISION
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   ASSOCIATED RECOVERY, LLC,
                                  Case 1:15-cv-01723
4
                 Plaintiff,
5
                                   Alexandria, Virginia
          v.
                                   April 15, 2016
  JOHN DOES 1-44, et al.,
                                   10:36 a.m.
6
7
                Defendants.
                                   Pages 1 - 12
8
9
         TRANSCRIPT OF DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS
10
            BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANTHONY J. TRENGA
11
              UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
12
   APPEARANCES:
13
   FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
14
        REBECCA J. STEMPIEN COYLE, ESQUIRE
15
        BRANDI M. BRENNER, ESQUIRE
        LEVY & GRANDINETTI
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18
  FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
19
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       COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPTION OF STENOGRAPHIC NOTES
     Rhonda F. Montgomery OCR-USDC/EDVA (703) 299-4599
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THE CLERK: Civil Action 1:15-cv-1723,
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  Associated Recovery, LLC v. John Does 1-44, et al.
 3
             Will counsel please identify themselves for
4
   the record.
5
             MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: Good morning, Your
  Honor. Rebecca Stempien Coyle from Levy & Grandinetti.
6
7
  With me is Brandi Brenner on behalf of the plaintiff,
  Associated Recovery.
9
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: Good morning, Your Honor.
  Lora Brzezynski of Dentons on behalf of certain
  defendants.
11
             THE COURT: All right. We're here on
12
13
  defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative,
14
  to transfer to the Northern District of Texas.
  reviewed the pleadings in this case. I'd be pleased to
15
  hear anything further from counsel that you think is
  necessary for the Court to consider.
17
18
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: Thank you, Your Honor.
19
             I'd just like to make a few points for Your
           In particular, I'd like to point out one
  Honor.
  argument by the plaintiff that, I think, goes to the
22
  very heart of this matter.
23
             THE COURT: Before you do that, would you
  confirm for me how many of the John Does certain
25
  defendants constitute. Your clients which you refer to
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as the certain defendants --
1
 2
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: Yes.
 3
             THE COURT: -- how many of the domain names
4
  are included within the certain defendants that you
5
  represent? Is it less than all of them?
6
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: It is, yes, less than all of
7
   them. There were a group of defendants for which we do
  not represent for which plaintiff obtained default
  igudgment against. We only represent a subset of the
10
  full defendants named in the caption. Does that answer
11
  your question, Your Honor?
12
             THE COURT: It does. How many of your
13
  clients are in the Eastern District of Texas
  proceeding, the Butcher case?
15
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI:
                              Eight.
16
             THE COURT:
                         So 8 out of 14?
                                         How many?
17
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: Twenty-six, Your Honor.
  apologize for not knowing that number off the top of my
18
19
  head.
20
             THE COURT: All right.
21
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: Eight are also in the
  Butcher case in the Eastern District of Texas.
22
23
             THE COURT: All right. As I understand your
24 position, your clients stipulate and agree that any
25
  relief with respect to these domain names can be
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entered against them by the Northern District of Texas.
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2
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: That is correct, Your Honor.
 3
             THE COURT: All right. Please, anything else
  you would like to say.
4
5
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: You know, with that, I think
  I'll sit down.
6
7
             THE COURT:
                         Okay.
8
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: Thank you.
9
             THE COURT: All right. Counsel.
10
             MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: Good morning, Your
11
  Honor.
          Just to --
12
             THE COURT: Just the sheer posture of this
13
  case, I'm sure you appreciate, makes it difficult for
  the Court to understand why it's here.
15
             MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: Yes. I understand, Your
16
  Honor.
17
             I want to just clear up one -- to the fact
18
  that it's relevant, I believe it's 14 of the domain
19
  names are defaulted. Counsel represents 26. There are
   two that default hasn't been entered yet because we
  weren't sure if they were going to be represented or
22
  not. I just want to make the Court aware of that, and
  that will be forthcoming.
2.4
             The stipulation to jurisdiction in the
25
  Northern District of Texas is something that is a new
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factual matter.
1
 2
             THE COURT: Default judgment has been entered
 3
  against --
 4
             MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: I believe Judge Anderson
5
  issued his report and recommendation for the default
   judgment against, I believe, 14 of them. We are
  waiting for the time period for them to protest to tidy
  up. I think it will come sometime this coming week
  before we bring it before Your Honor to tie up.
10
             THE COURT: All right. So if this Court were
   to transfer the case, what would you propose as to
  those defaulting defendants?
13
             MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: For the defaulted
  defendants, Your Honor, we would propose that they stay
15
  here because they are in rem. The whole reason for any
  sort of transfer to the Northern District of Texas
17
  would be the in personam jurisdiction. Without in
18
  personam jurisdiction, the ACPA requires that the
19
  in rem stay where the domain registry resides, which is
  here in Virginia. Since we have no indication that the
21
  defaulted parties have any personal jurisdiction in
  Texas, the location for the default must remain here.
22
23
             THE COURT: Do you know the identities of the
  owners of those domain names?
25
             MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: Not with certainty, Your
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Honor. A lot of them, the information provided is
1
  questionable. Addresses are incomplete or almost
2
  clearly inaccurate and misleading. For the most parts,
   they have been completely silent in response.
4
5
             We also did not know the identities of --
   other than from the WhoIs records, we did not know the
6
7
  lidentities of these certain defendants prior to the
  filing.
8
9
             THE COURT: How were they served?
10
             MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: We've been sending
11
   e-mail to the e-mail address listed in the WhoIs, as
12
  well as postal mail to that same address. We also did
13
   a service by publication pursuant to the court order.
14
             THE COURT: All right. Thank you.
15
             Anything else?
16
             MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: The only other thing the
17
  plaintiff would bring up is that should these certain
18
  defendants be transferred to Texas, we would just like
19
  to be clear that each of the individual certain
20
   defendants does understand and does stipulate to the
21
  personal jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the Texas
  court to enter the relief.
22
23
             I understand it's a very overwhelming and
24 maybe jumbled situation, it seems, for defendants'
25
  counsel based on the papers we've seen from them to
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date and the conversations we've had with them.
  understand they are all primarily in China, if not all
  ∥in China. It seems that there is one -- I think he's a
   defendant who is organizing or kind of acting as a
  point person for the remaining of the defendants.
5
  would just like to be clear that it is not just that
  point person who is stipulating on behalf of all of the
  defendants, but that each individual defendant is
9
  stipulating to the jurisdiction of Texas.
                         That's what I understand.
10
             THE COURT:
11
             MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: Thank you, Your Honor.
12
             THE COURT: All right. Anything further?
13
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: Yes, Your Honor. I think
  lit's worthwhile to clarify two points. First, as to
  Xiaofeng Lin, who is the owner of five of the domain
  names, he is actually on the face of one of the domain
17
  name transfer agreements. He has consented to the
18
  personal jurisdiction of Texas; thus, there's no in rem
19
  jurisdiction over him here because there's in personam
20
  jurisdiction in Texas.
21
             THE COURT: All right.
22
             MS. BRZEZYNSKI: So the case against him
23
  cannot stand.
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             As for the remaining domain names that I
25
  represent, Your Honor, eight already in the Butcher
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case and then the other remaining ones, my clients have stipulated that we will not challenge the jurisdiction of the Northern District of Texas to order the domain registrar in Virginia to transfer the domain names if 5 we do not prevail in Texas. THE COURT: On the merits. MS. BRZEZYNSKI: On the merits, yes. THE COURT: Right. 9 MS. BRZEZYNSKI: I must tell you, Your Honor: That is a very, very big issue in the case and one where -- the very beginning of my argument I was saying Ithere's one argument that goes to the heart of 13 plaintiff's case, and that's the assumption that the domain name transfer agreements are invalid and that 15 the receivers on behalf of Novo Point had no right to transfer those agreements. That is very, very much an 17 lissue which the Northern District of Texas has retained 18 exclusive jurisdiction over. 19 In fact, if those domain name transfer agreements were pursuant to the Northern District of 21 Texas and there's an order that says so and are, in 22 fact, valid, then Novo Point had nothing to transfer, no asset to transfer to Associated Recovery at all, 2.4 Your Honor.

THE COURT: I understand.

MS. BRZEZYNSKI: You know, it also begs the question: Who is Associated Recovery? Is it really Jeff Baron pulling the strings, which we have reason to believe, hiding behind the jurisdiction of the ACPA to try to avoid at all cost the Northern District of Texas where he has been, essentially, called a vexatious litigant repeatedly by that court?

THE COURT: All right.

MS. BRZEZYNSKI: Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

This case is before the Court on defendants' motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to transfer venue to the Northern District of Texas. The Court has reviewed the briefing and the other information available to it. It concludes that the case should be transferred to the Northern District of Texas.

In that district, there has been years of related proceedings that have occurred, as well as the entry of an order directing that issues raised in this case be filed in that court. Those proceedings have included both a court ordered and supervised receivership under which the domain names that are the subject of this litigation were sold by a receiver appointed in that district and also the unwinding and winding down of that receivership as directed by the

Fifth Circuit.

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Those proceedings, as I've indicated, have included a certain order dated March 2015 related to that winding down of the receivership that explicitly stated that the Northern District of Texas retains exclusive jurisdiction over, among other things, any controversy that arises from or relates to the receivership or actions of the receivership or his professionals.

This action is squarely within the scope of that order, which was entered against a party through whom the plaintiff claims its rights; the domain names that were sold in that receivership; and to the extent that the plaintiff challenges the propriety of that order, it should pursue that objection in the Northern District of Texas or the Fifth Circuit.

Moreover, there were forum selection clauses appearing in certain assignments entered into by another entity through which plaintiff claims its rights pertaining to some of the domain names at issue here, which specifically designates the Northern District of Texas or Texas state court to hear those disputes.

There also appears to be another overlapping lawsuit that the plaintiff has initiated in Texas,

2.4

albeit in the Eastern District of Texas, involving many of the same domain names as those at issue here.

The Court has also considered the plaintiff's arguments that this case should remain in this district by virtue of its in rem jurisdiction over the domain names. Without getting into whether plaintiff's claims, in fact, appropriately arise under the anticybersquatting statute, it appears in any event that there's no reason to think that personal jurisdiction cannot be obtained over these certain defendants who claim these domain names as evidenced by both plaintiff's claims in the Eastern District of Texas against certain of these certain defendants and also the certain defendants' stipulation that they consent to the jurisdiction of the Northern District of Texas for the purposes of providing any remedy with respect to the transfer of these domain names.

In that regard, the anticybersquatting act specifically contemplates that such claims will be asserted where there is personal jurisdiction as the preferred course reserving *in rem* jurisdiction for those cases where personal jurisdiction is not obtainable.

For these same reasons, the Court concludes that transfer under 28 U.S.C. 1404(a) is appropriate.

Based on the record before the Court, the Court 1 concludes that the action could have been filed in the Northern District of Texas. The convenience of the parties and witnesses are facilitated in Texas, and the 5 interest of justice is served by transfer to Texas. 6 Accordingly, the Court will grant the motion 7 and transfer this case as to the certain defendants to the Northern District of Texas. 9 I must say: I hadn't focused on the fact 10 that some of these defendants had already defaulted in 11 this district. I'm not going to transfer at this time this case as to those defaulting defendants, but the 12 13 transfer order will be limited to the claims against 14 the certain defendants in this case. 15 MS. BRZEZYNSKI: Thank you, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: The Court will enter an order. 17 Anything further? 18 MS. STEMPIEN COYLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 19 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 20 Counsel is excused. 21 The Court will stand in recess. 22 Time: 10:49 a.m. 23 I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcription of my stenographic notes. 2.4 /s/ 25 Rhonda F. Montgomery, CCR, RPR